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POLAND IN THE EUROPEAN UNION -  REACHING 
BEYOND THE LIBERAL PERSPECTIVE OF ANALYSIS
The accession of Poland to the European Union contributes to the successful liberal 
story of the Polish transformation after the fall of the bipolar order. The liberal vision of 
Poland’s membership in the community is an image of unprecedented entrepreneur­
ship, dynamic co-operation, and the EU’s financial assistance that facilitate the state’s 
development. The article appreciates this picture, yet it indicates that the liberal per­
spective forgets about some serious tendencies, both at the systemic and domestic 
levels, that may considerably impede future Polish development. The liberals underes­
timate the inequalities of power in the European Union. They miss the threat of the 
marginalization of Poland as a permanent “semi-peripheral” member of the commu­
nity. Finally, the liberal perspective disregards about some ambiguities, misperceptions 
and inconsistencies in the state’s own development policy.
The aim of the article is to prove that the reality of Polish membership in the Euro­
pean Union is too complicated to enclose it in the liberal frames of analysis. The text re­
fers to some theoretical and practical insights reaching beyond the liberal confines, 
mainly to the (neoclassical) realist and globalist perspectives. It shares the liberal 
claims that the membership in the EU opens up new opportunities for Poland. Yet it in­
dicates the obstacles that modify the positive impulses following the accession. It out­
lines possible consequences of the fall of the integration mechanisms in Europe. 
Nevertheless, it warns that even the positive scenario of the European Union able to 
overcome the recent crisis confronts Poland with some serious challenges -  including 
the shift of the “core” of the integration to the Euro-zone. The article urges that an ade­
quate Polish response needs the state’s ability to analyse the power relations in the 
EU and identify its national interests. It notes, however, some domestic problems in 
this regard.
The text is divided into three parts. The first studies the opportunities and con­
straints for Polish development after the state’s accession to the European Union. It 
refers to the weakness of the liberal analysis and the explanations offered by (neoclassi­
cal) realism and globalism. The second part considers the crisis of the European Union, 
the future challenges for Poland, and its role in the EU. The third indicates possible pos­
sible problems for Poland with the adequate response to these challenges and identifi­
cation of the state’s national interests in the new international reality. In both cases the 
paper notes the strengths and weaknesses of the liberal perspective of analysis and indi­
cates the contribution offered by the (neoclassical) realist perspective.
The article refers to the author’s previous considerations about the anomalies that 
the liberal approach faces in contemporary international relations (Wi^clawski, 2015b)
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as well as the possible rapprochement between the liberal and realist perspectives of 
analysis (Wi^clawski, 2015a). The aim of the current text, however, is not to repeat the 
previous theses and focus on the theoretical considerations alone. It serves as a practi­
cally-oriented illustration of the author’s main conclusion that the analysis of Polish 
membership in the European Union reaches far beyond the liberal perspective.
THE EUROPEAN UNION -  THE OPPORTUNITIES AND CONSTRAINTS 
FOR THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF POLAND
Seen from the liberal perspective, the accession of Poland to the European Union 
anchors the country in the European sphere of democracy and liberal market economy. 
The liberals correctly indicate that the logic of cooperation and compromise contributes 
to the “community context” of international relations in Europe. They are right that 
open borders facilitate entrepreneurship and encourage contact among the people in the 
EU (Russett, 2010: 109-111; Gilbert, 2003: 1-4). Furthermore, the liberal perspective 
correctly indicates the obvious benefits for Poland from its access to the European mar­
ket and the European Union’s financial support for the country from the structural and 
cohesion funds. It is right that the last two decades of the liberal transformation have 
considerably changed the economic reality of Poland and membership in the EU 
strengthens the positive impulses. Finally, one can easily agree that the dynamic devel­
opment of Polish small and medium size enterprises after the fall of the bipolar order 
has been Poland’s spectacular success (Buckley, 2015).
Yet, the liberal perspective underestimates some tendencies, both at the domestic 
and international (systemic) level, which may considerably modify the liberal picture 
of Polish membership in the European Union and its impact on the state’s further devel­
opment. First, it tends to forget about the inequalities of power in the EU and the game 
of national interests inside the community that favours its most powerful members. 
Second, the liberal attitude misses the position of Poland as a “semi-periphery” state in 
the configuration of power inside the European Union and the danger of the permanent 
“semi-peripheral” character of Polish membership in the EU. Third, the liberals forget 
that membership in the European Union does not automatically translate itself into the 
state’s competitiveness, especially if confronted with some ambiguities and inconsis­
tencies in the state’s development strategy.
In fact, the liberal attitude underestimates the inequality of power in the European 
Union between the old and the new (post-communist) members of the community. The 
liberal rhetoric tends to ignore its lasting consequences, especially for the position and 
role of the weaker members of the EU. This discrepancy, at least for the economic 
power, is still considerable and the GDP per capita of the wealthiest states of the Euro­
pean Union exceeds those of the new members by three times. The cohesion policy of 
the EU helps to reduce this gap and the states of East-Central Europe have generally 
better copied with the recent economic crisis in Europe than the Western members of 
the community (Balcerowicz, Rzonca, et al., 2013: 28-30). Nevertheless, the distance 
between these two parts of the European Union is still significant (Central Statistical 
Office, 2014: 115).
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Poland is no exception in this regard. Despite some other components of its power, 
including the demographic potential, the state is a weak member of the European Union 
in the economic sense and its GDP per capita (PPP) remains well below the EU’s aver­
age (Central Statistical Office, 2014: 115). Even if the last two decades of the Polish 
transformation have been a successful liberal story Poland has not so far solved its seri­
ous structural problems, which include the reform of the pension system, energy effec­
tiveness or international competitiveness ofits economy (Balcerowicz, 2015). Besides, 
despite the unprecedented entrepreneurship, two decades of transformation have been 
too short to build companies capable on being on a par with the European leaders 
(Wójcik, 2009: 170-176). Some examples of successful world-scale firms from Poland 
are still overshadowed by domestic debates about the obstacles for economic activity in 
the country caused by administrative barriers and bureaucracy (Smallbone, Welter, 
2009: 171-178). The accession to the European Union marked a considerable recovery 
in this regard yet the complaints about overregulation still accompany the business 
activity in Poland. As a consequence, many Polish firms are valued as solid sub-con­
tractors for stronger companies in the EU. Few of them, however, reached the level of 
the European leaders and David Lane indicates in this regard only one Polish firm 
among the 500 world largest companies at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first 
century (Lane, 2013: 24-25).
Hence, the perspective of (neoclassical) realism will certainly not oppose the clear 
benefits accompanying Poland’s membership in the European Union (both in the eco­
nomic and political sense). Yet it reminds that the leadership of the economic processes 
in the European Union belongs to much wealthier old members of the community. It 
will warn that despite the rhetoric of the community of interests, values, and aims the 
political reality in Europe is still the reality of national interests. The integration pro­
cesses in Europe have reduced the most radical manifestations of the power politics and 
introduced advanced instruments to master the struggle for power on the continent 
(Gilbert, 2003: 1-4). Yet, even if reduced, this struggle still manifests in the European 
politics and the rhetoric of the community of interests does not exclude the attempts of 
the most powerful members of the European Union to act for their own benefits and to 
promote their own interests (Taylor, 2008: 8-12). Poland, in this context, is a medium 
size member of the EU with limited power and it still faces the dilemma of “the con­
sumer” of ideas proposed by the strongest.
As a result, even if the liberal perspective correctly indicates the significance of 
membership in the European Union for the future development of Poland, it cannot ig­
nore that the inequality of power in the EU remains the structural obstacle that will limit 
the ability of the state to pursue its economic and political interests. The liberal rhetoric 
cannot ignore that even in the cohesion policy of the European Union a considerable 
part of the EU’s support for Poland comes back to the enterprises from the most devel­
oped countries of the European Union. The leading European companies, with their 
capital, technology, and management capabilities, are usually better prepared to win the 
public tenders in Poland than the local competitors. The Polish firms, with few excep­
tions, could serve as valuable sub-contractors in the broader international consortia but 
they are not their leaders. Recent Polish infrastructural projects illustrate this thesis and 
the estimates indicate that for each Euro spent in Poland in the frame of the cohesion
130 Jacek WIĘCŁAWSKI
policy 32 euro cents come back to the companies from the old Europe. For Germany, 
however, the leading economic partner of Poland and the strongest member of the EU, 
this figure rises to 61 euro cents (Niklewicz, 2010).
In addition, Poland and most other East-Central European members still belong to 
a specific “semi-periphery” of the European Union, to paraphrase the Immanuel 
Wallerstein’s world-system analysis (Wallerstein, 1996: 87-89). Their distance from 
the economic “core” of the community remains considerable and they can compete 
with the leaders only in some selected areas of the integration. David Lane underlines in 
this context that “The reformed Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) of 
the former socialist bloc have joined the world economic system through their member­
ship of the European Union (EU). In doing so, they have become absorbed into the eco­
nomic mechanisms dominated by the hegemonic old member states of the EU”. 
Besides, “They are becoming integrated into the economies of old EU states on the 
terms of the latter. They are bound to the political economy of the EU of which -  while 
enjoying its freedom of movement -  they are likely to remain relatively poorer mem­
bers” (Lane, 2013: 23, 38).
In fact, Poland still competes in the European market more with lower costs of work 
than its technological and economic potential (Buckley, 2015). This translates into into 
low salaries, which remain at one of the lowest levels in the European Union, and the 
fear of poverty among the people, despite the country’s membership in the community 
(Leszczynski, 2011; Wojciechowski, 2013: 21-24). It is difficult to expect a radical 
change in this regard and the globalist perspective correctly warns against the perma­
nent, “semi-peripheral” nature of Polish membership in the EU. It indicates the struc­
tural impediments in the new members’ relations with the economic “core” of the 
community and concludes that despite the liberal rhetoric of equal chances, the leaders 
of the European Union may not necessarily be interested in change of the “semi-periph­
eral” character of East-Central Europe.
Furthermore, the example of Poland is even more complicated as Polish develop­
ment still depends on external sources of capital, including financial financial support 
from European Union. The use of the European funds, however, seems disputable (at 
least in the long term perspective). Indeed, Poland will receive about 106 billion Euros 
in the financial period 2014-2020 and it received 67 billion Euros in the period of 
2007-2013 (Steindl, 2013). This support is impressive and the enthusiasts of the 
infrastructural progress indicate the “infrastructural revolution” in Poland together 
with the inflow of the EU’s structural funds. Nevertheless, the realist perspective points 
out the high costs of some infrastructural projects, especially those in the network of 
new highways, as well as controversial practices like spending the European Union’s 
funds on aqua parks or training in administration and the public sector. Some of them, 
teaching how to use computer programs or databases, do provoke a question of advis­
ability and purposefulness (Socha, 2011).
The dynamic investment in infrastructure is justified by Polish backwardness 
after the communist period. Nevertheless, the question is whether the emphasis on 
infrastructure will contribute to future innovation and competitiveness of Poland (Sro- 
czynski, 2015). The realist answer is negative. It seems that the investment in infra­
structure and little attention paid to pro-innovative reforms will not be able to increase
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the long term competitiveness of the Polish economy. Furthermore, it may potentially 
be dangerous -  especially in the face of the growing costs of maintenance of grand 
infrastructural projects. Besides, the realist approach warns that the European Union’s 
financial support for Poland will gradually be decreased and the impact of the EU’s 
funds on the Polish economy may be considerably reduced. It seems that, in the face of 
the recent economic, social, and political crisis in the European Union the next EU’s fi­
nancial perspective will not be as generous for Poland as 2014-2020.
Thus, Leszek Balcerowicz leaves no illusions and emphasises that without immedi­
ate reforms and new pro-innovative impulses the state will not be able to reduce its dis­
tance from the richest members of the European Union. He warns that the past 
successes of the Polish economy may not guarantee the state’s future development 
(Balcerowicz, 2015; Buckley, 2015). Similarly, Ryszard Zi^ba indicates the low expen­
ditures on research and development activity in Poland that remain well below the level 
of one percent of Polish GDP. He concludes that even if the Polish economy has so far 
copied with the global economic crisis, the lack of today’s investment in innovation 
may seriously impede its competitiveness in the post-crisis reality (Zi^ba, 2011:14). As 
a consequence, the liberals correctly emphasise the significance of the European Un­
ion’s financial support for future Polish development. The realist perspective, however, 
corrects this optimistic picture and warns that the EU’s financial assistance for Poland 
will not increase the state’s competitiveness alone, especially if  accompanied by an am­
biguous and inconsistent vision of this development.
POLAND AND THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
European integration is in a crisis today that jeopardises its very existence. Even if 
speculation about the collapse of the European Union is exaggerated any responsible 
analysis must be able to outline the consequences of the fall of norms and institutions 
that have so far stabilized international affairs in Europe. The liberal attitude is not the 
best perspective in this regard. It is prepared to analyse the mechanisms of integration, 
cooperation, and coordination, but not necessarily the disintegration of the European 
project. It seems that neoclassical realism, with its understanding of the consequences 
of power politics and emphasis on both structural and domestic determinants of the 
state’s foreign policy, would be a more adequate attitude to analyse the crisis and the 
potential fall of the EU (Taliaferro, Lobell, Ripsman, 2009: 3-5).
Thus, the gradual collapse of the mechanisms of integration would have serious 
consequences for all members of the community yet East-Central Europe, as the 
“semi-periphery” in the EU’s configuration of power, would probably suffer most. It 
would mean the growing brutalization of international relations in Europe and disre­
gard of the European leaders for the interests of less powerful states. It would be a re­
turn to power politics and abandoning of the previous principles of self-limitation and 
moderation (Fiszer, 2013: 22; Gilbert, 2003: 1-4). Europe would concurrently come 
back to the logic of changing political alliances and counter-alliances. Yet, weak and 
unstable, they would only deepen the political chaos on the continent and serve the in­
terests of the most powerful actors, to include those outside the falling EU. Ethnic con­
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flicts could explode again as the collapse of the European Union would fuel the ethnic 
disputes on the continent and encourage some countries to solve them with more radical 
pressure (Troebst, Daftary, 2003: 1-7). Besides, the fall of European integration could 
be dangerous for the political stability of the European democracies. Growing uncer­
tainty in the social, political, and economic future could strengthen the radical parties 
and bring a new wave of populism.
In the case of Poland, the collapse of the European Union would further deteriorate 
the geopolitical position of the state. The tendency of Germany to cooperate with Rus­
sia above the head of East-Central Europe, that has so far been mitigated by the Euro­
pean context of German foreign policy, would certainly be deepened (Timmins, 2007: 
170-171, 178-180). It would provoke Polish efforts to prevent German-Russian rap­
prochement -  countered by Russian propaganda and most probably inefficient. The 
growing fears of the Russian-German partnership would also strengthen the 
pro-Atlantic politics of Poland, to include the expectations of the strong US military 
presence on Polish territory. The US response, however, could not meet Polish hopes 
and analysis of the US strategic interests could finally be disappointing for Poland. Fur­
thermore, the collapse of the European Union could result in growing economic diffi­
culties for the state. The limited competitiveness of the Polish economy and possible 
(radical) outflow of investment capital could considerably slow down Polish develop­
ment, depreciate the Polish national currency and cause some problems with the stabil­
ity of the Polish financial system.
The problem of Poland, however, is that even with the positive scenario of the Euro­
pean Union able to overcome the recent crisis the state would be faced some serious 
challenges. There are at least three tendencies that would confront Poland with the need 
of its new political strategy. First, the success of the European Union would bring about 
a strong impulse for new federal steps, especially in the field of the economic integra­
tion and in the frameworks of the Euro-zone. Some further attempts towards the com­
mon fiscal policy seem obvious in this regard. Second, a more serious debate in the 
European Union would have to be initiated about the role of Germany in the commu­
nity, the growing power of this country and the need to keep it in the European integra­
tion frameworks. Third, a strong tendency is expected, at least among the old states of 
the EU, to come back to business as usual with Russia, despite the recent aggressive 
policy of Moscow. In all these examples a more comprehensive theoretical analysis, 
reaching beyond the liberal assumptions, seems necessary as well.
Indeed, if the European Union succeeds, the centre of the community’s deci­
sion-making will shift to the states of the Euro-zone. The successful transformation of 
the EU will increase the pressure for new federal solutions, to include the common fis­
cal policy and more intrusive control of the community over the financial deficits of its 
members -  to prevent a repeat of the Greek scenario (Jokela, 2013:4-6). This tendency, 
however, will promote the concentration of the most advanced integration processes in 
the hands of a limited group of EU members. Once implemented, it would confront Po­
land with the threat of real and lasting marginalization in the European Union if the 
state rejects the Euro.
In addition, the successful “revival” of the European Union would require no less 
successful an answer to the question of the Germany’s role in the community (Hof-
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hansel, 2005: 2-3; Miskimmon, 2007: 33-36). Paul Taylor emphasises in this context 
that “The EU had served the German purpose of providing a context for recovering sov­
ereignty and becoming a satisfied power” yet “Although the Germans were still anx­
ious to maintain and deepen good relations with the Europeans, they were now more 
prepared to act on their own account” (Taylor, 2008: 67). It is not clear whether the new 
German role would be reflected by the formal changes in the structure of the European 
Union, to include the establishment of the new bodies of the Economic and Monetary 
Union. Yet, it becomes obvious that in practice no strategic decisions in Europe would 
be taken without the consent of Germany.
Seen from the liberal point of view the accession of Poland to the European Union 
has introduced a new community context to Polish-German relations and still contrib­
utes to dialogue with Germany. The role of the German market in Polish foreign trade 
(about 30 percent of Polish exports) illustrates the scale of Polish-German economic re­
lations (Baun, 2005: 375-377, 385; Hofhansel, 2005: 17-20). Nevertheless, this opti­
mistic liberal perspective must be modified by some realist conclusions about 
a divergence of interests between the two states, irrespective of their membership in the 
EU. The Polish criticism towards the German-Russian rapprochement and the German 
reluctance towards “exaggerated” Polish pro-Americanism could be a good illustration 
of this conclusion (Oldberg, 2007: 22-23). The inequality of power between the two 
states is obvious and there is no need to prove it again. Besides, the experience of the 
first decade in the European Union confirms the limited ability of Poland to influence 
German foreign policy and the growing role of Germany in the EU will probably reduce 
it even further. In the same vein, the recent Russian-Ukrainian conflict illustrates that it 
is difficult to imagine the new Eastern policy of the European Union without the active 
participation of Germany and the acceptance for at least some German ideas. Similarly, 
it is difficult to believe that Poland will be able to considerably shape this policy with­
out German support for the Polish proposals. Thus, finding its own answer to the grow­
ing power of Germany becomes a fundamental challenge for the political elites 
in Poland.
Finally, the context of the possible reset in European-Russian relations after the re­
cent Ukrainian crisis becomes another crucial problem for Polish foreign policy. Poland 
must be aware that the country is considered by some leading European companies as 
obstacle for their further successful economic deals with Russia. Thus, some powerful 
European business groups and political forces may not be interested in the increase of 
the Polish role in the European Union. Some of them could even contribute to the image 
of Poland as the most “rusophobic” country of the EU created by Russian propaganda 
(Oldberg, 2007: 22-23). Besides, Polish anxiety about Russia would probably not at­
tract any serious attention among the Western European and even some East-Central 
European states. The recent Czech and Hungarian declarations about the need for good 
economic cooperation with Russia illustrate this conclusion (Luhn, 2014). Facing the 
promises of new benefits in relations with Russia few European states would risk show­
ing an “understanding” for Polish fears. This would contribute to further isolation and 
marginalization of Poland in the European Union and the tendency of its most powerful 
members to build the new partnership with Russia irrespective of Polish interests. This, 
again, is more the realist than the liberal perspective.
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POLAND IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE CHALLENGES 
FOR THE STATE’S POLITICAL STRATEGY
Discussing the value of the European Union, the liberals rightly emphasise the sense 
of community, institutions, and norms contributing to co-operation and self-restriction 
(Russett, 2010: 109-111). Nevertheless, they tend to miss that the integration processes 
in Europe limit the struggle for power on the continent but do not eliminate it from the 
European politics. Thus, membership in the European Union does not exempt the 
state’s political elites from sober analysis of the configuration of power and the game of 
interests inside the community’s frameworks. It is not the rejection of dialogue and 
compromise. Yet it is the case of the state’s political strategy. It is the question of the 
state’s ability to define its interests, aims and effective instruments of its policy even in 
the dynamic environment of the regional integration bodies. The recent crisis of Euro­
pean integration complicates this ability yet some members of the EU still better cope 
with defining their strategic aims while the politics of others remain reactive.
The liberal perspective, again, would not be the best point of reference to analyse 
these problems. The liberals favour the debate about the potential of cooperation yet 
they tend to avoid the questions of leadership and strategy as “old fashioned” and be­
longing to the world of power politics (Morgenthau, 1947: 23-27). For (classical and 
neoclassical) realists, however, the state’s ability to properly identify its interest re­
mains the asset and the source of the state’s power even in the regional integration 
frameworks. Some of Hans J. Morgenthau’s remarks about the state’s ability to distin­
guish between the non-negotiable national aims, fundamental to its security and devel­
opment, and secondary interests that may be devoted to reach a reasonable compromise 
sound adequately in this regard (Morgenthau, 1952: 976-977). Morgenthau noted that 
“No nation has the resources to promote all desirable objectives with equal vigor; all 
nations must therefore allocate their scarce resources as rationally as possible. The 
in dispensable precondition of such rational allocation is a clear understanding of the 
distinction between the necessary and variable elements of the national interest” 
(Morgenthau, 1952: 977).
Nevertheless, it seems that Poland, and most other states of East-Central Europe, 
still face some problems with the distinction between their fundamental and secondary 
aims, especially if confronted with the game of interests inside the European Union and 
the political strategies of its leaders. Besides, the crisis of the European Union faces Po­
land with the need for a more profound review of its interests and the ability of strategic 
analysis becomes fundamental in this regard. Yet, the practice of recent years indicates 
at least three tendencies in Polish foreign and domestic politics that might limit the 
state’s ability to develop its new effective political strategy. The first is the problem of 
the political elites, their immaturity and tendency to focus on short-term political gains. 
The second is the presence of strong symbolic elements in the Polish perception of Eu­
ropean affairs and the third is the inconsistency of the Polish attitude to the problems of 
European integration.
Indeed, the (neoclassical) realist perspective notes that the further development of 
Poland is still influenced by some domestic political determinants, including the imma­
turity of political elites (irrespective of their political colours). It emphasises that vari­
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able and inexperienced political elites in Poland may face serious difficulties in 
developing a broader strategy of the state’s long-term development, especially if con­
fronted with an unfavourable international environment. The lack of their consensus on 
the fundamental aims of Polish foreign policy is symptomatic in this regard (Zięba, 
2011: 16-17). Another problem is a tendency among the political forces to focus more 
on the short-term political gains than the strategic challenges. This usually results in de­
clarative programs followed by the propensity not to provoke discontent among voters 
(Prażmowska, 2010:251-253). Again, it is not a reference to any single political option 
but a more general conclusion and warning about possible problems.
Furthermore, the realist perspective notes that the Polish attitude towards Euro­
pean integration is full of symbols. It indicates that the accession to the European Un­
ion served not only the economic and political aims. It was a symbolic confirmation 
of the links of Poland with the heritage of the West and the full participation of the 
country in the mainstream processes on the continent (O’Brennan, 2006: 14; Davies, 
2001: 312). The sense of belonging to the culture of the West has always been impor­
tant for the Polish national character and Norman Davies concludes in this regard 
that “Poland’s traditional culture is so deeply ingrained that [...] the pro-Western 
sympathies of the Polish population hardly need to be discussed” (Davies, 2001: 
312). Besides, the history of the twentieth century still influences Polish-German and 
Polish-Russian relations and it is difficult to expect a radical change in this regard. 
The (classical and neoclassical) realist perspective does not ignore the significance of 
the nation’s historical experience. Morgenthau considered the national character as 
one of the serious elements ofthe state’s power (Morgenthau, 1948: 96-100). Never­
theless, the realists will warn that the presence of strong symbolic elements in the Pol­
ish attitude to European integration may affect the analysis of the game of interests in 
the European Union, the evolution of the power relations in the community, and the 
changes of its leadership. It is not a disregard for the Polish historical experience but 
rather a recommendation for the calm, sober and interest-oriented analysis of the dy­
namic changes on the international scene.
Third, the Polish attitude to the problems of the European Union has not always 
been consistent and consequent (Fiszer, 2007:90). One of the examples in this regard is 
the case of the Euro. Joining the European Union, Poland accepted its ultimate acces­
sion to the Euro-zone. The Polish attitude towards the common European currency, 
however, has so far been ambiguous and, together with the economic crisis of the com­
munity, the reservation towards the Euro is considered as a political wisdom (Kie­
puszewski, 2015; Mayer, 2012: 1-2). Some arguments in this context seem to be 
justified. Nevertheless, similar calculations may lose their ground if the “reinvigo­
rated” European Union speeds up its political agenda. Further principal opposition of 
Poland to the adoption of the Euro would then risk pushing Polish interests to the mar­
gin of the new debates in the EU. It is not the aim of this article to decide this question 
yet if membership in the European Union serves to strengthen the economic security of 
Poland (also in the context of its relations with Russia) the adoption of the Euro could 
be considered as a reasonable decision. Similarly, if  Poland declares to be among the 
leaders of the integration processes in Europe, it would be difficult to think about it 
staying outside the Euro-zone.
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In the same vein, the recovery of the European Union might provoke debate about 
its further enlargement, to include Turkey and possibly Ukraine. Poland has unequiv­
ocally supported the idea of enlargement and the stability of the EU’s Eastern neigh­
bourhood is (rightly) the fundamental geostrategic aim of Polish foreign policy 
(Zi^ba, 2011: 29). Nevertheless, more in depth analysis of such enlargement would 
reveal some serious economic consequences for the current “semi-periphery” of the 
European Union. It seems that the accession of a new, big country to the East­
ern/South-Eastern neighbourhood would inevitably mean a considerable fall in the 
European Union’s financial assistance for East-Central Europe. The new member 
would probably repeat the previous Polish path and compete on the European market 
with the costs of work, lower even than in Poland. It would encourage Western Euro­
pean companies to transfer their investments to the new member state and revive 
the question of the sources of further competitiveness of the Polish economy (Small- 
bone and Welter, 2009: 166-169,178-183). Thus, the geopolitical gains would entail 
an economic price.
As a consequence, the crisis of the European Union does not encourage the serious 
debate about the future of the continent and the scenario of the collapse of the integra­
tion mechanisms still scares the political elites in Europe. Nevertheless, if the commu­
nity overcomes the crisis, it will hardly be possible for Poland to play a significant role 
in the EU without clear answers to some fundamental problems of integration, to in­
clude the question of Polish accession to the Euro-zone. If the community survives, its 
new dynamic evolution may confront Poland with the need for adequate reactions to the 
growing power of Germany, the revival of the EU’s relations with Russia and the dan­
ger of stagnation of the Polish economy. The difficulties in the analysis of the new 
power relations in Europe and problems with the identification of the state’s primary 
and secondary interests may contribute to the marginalization of Poland in the Euro­
pean Union. Similarly, the lack of the state’s long-term strategy could result in an emo­
tional and ineffective foreign policy. It is up to the responsible leadership to prevent this 
scenario and think about the problems.
* * *
The article proves that any serious analysis of the social, political and economic reality 
of Poland after its accession to the European Union must reach beyond liberal confines. The 
question of Polish membership in the EU is too complex to enclose it in the liberal frame­
works. The liberal perspective tends to miss the consequences of the inequality of power in 
the European Union and the game of national interests still being played in the EU. The lib­
erals underestimate the role of the systemic and domestic constraints that may considerably 
influence the further development of Poland. They miss the ambiguities and inconsisten­
cies in the country’s vision of this development. Thus, some (neoclassical) realist conclu­
sions about the limited competitiveness of the Polish economy and difficulties with the 
identification of the state’s strategic interests seem justified in this context. Similarly, some 
globalists warn against the danger of the marginalization of Poland (and East-Central Eu­
rope in general) as permanent “semi-peripheral” participants of the integration processes on 
the continent sound seriously as well.
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It is obvious that the membership in the European Union has considerably strength­
ened Poland’s chances of dynamic development. The aim of the article has not been to 
undermine the success story of the Polish liberal transformation. Nevertheless, the arti­
cle insists that this liberal picture needs some realist correction. In the same vein, the 
danger of the fall of the European Union’s mechanisms of integrations only strengthens 
the previous challenges and the possible dynamic changes in the configuration of 
power on the continent will face Poland with some new strategic problems. The case of 
the shift of the “core” of the European integration to the Euro-zone and the question of 
the new role of Germany in the community, as indicated in the article, seem only to il­
lustrate the many future challenges. Thus, the analysis of the crisis of the European Un­
ion and its consequences for the Polish role in the community certainly crosses the 
liberal confines.
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ABSTRACT
The article refers to Polish membership in the European Union and the liberal perspective 
of its analysis. The paper discusses the shortages of the liberal approach. The article accepts the 
liberal thesis regarding the opportunities that the accession to the EU opens up for Polish devel­
opment. It notes the significance of the European mechanisms of regional cooperation. Never­
theless, the paper emphasises that the liberal perspective ignores the inequalities of power in the 
European Union and misses some serious tendencies, both at the level of the community and in 
the domestic politics, that impede the state’s development. Thus, the article refers to the limited 
competitiveness of the Polish economy and the state’s difficulties with the identification 
of its interests in the dynamic and variable international environment. It warns against the 
marginalization of Poland as “semi-peripheral” member of the European Union. The main con­
clusion of the paper is that the case of Polish membership in the EU is too complicated to close it 
in the liberal frameworks. The liberal perspective needs a realist correction. It is extremely im­
portant in the context of the challenges that Poland faces together with the crisis of the European 
integration.
Key words: European Union, Poland
POLSKA W UNII EUROPEJSKIEJ -  WYKRACZAJĄC POZA LIBERALNĄ 
PERSPEKTYWĘ ANALIZY
STRESZCZENIE
Artykuł odnosi się do członkostwa Polski w Unii Europejskiej i liberalnej perspektywy ana­
lizy tej problematyki. Autor wskazuje wyraźne problemy liberalnego podejścia do omawianej 
kwestii. Artykuł akceptuje wprawdzie liberalne tezy o szansach, jakie członkostwo w Unii Euro­
pejskiej otwiera dla dalszego rozwoju Polski. Uznaje również znaczenie europejskich mechaniz­
mów współpracy regionalnej. Podkreśla jednak, że liberalna perspektywa ignoruje nierówności 
potęgi między państwami członkowskimi Unii oraz pomija kilka istotnych tendencji (w wymia­
rze wspólnotowym, jak i wewnątrzpolitycznym), które utrudniać mogą dalszy rozwój kraju. 
W efekcie, artykuł odwołuje się do problemów z efektywnością polskiej gospodarki, a także 
trudności państwa w zdefiniowaniu swych interesów w zmieniającym się dynamicznie środowi­
sku międzynarodowym. Ostrzega przed marginalizacją Polski jako “półperyferyjnego” członka 
Unii Europejskiej. Podstawową konkluzją artykułu jest, że złożona kwestia członkostwa Polski 
w Unii wykracza dalece poza liberalną perspektywę analizy tej problematyki. Ujęcie liberalne 
wymaga oczywistej realistycznej korekty. Jest to szczególnie istotne w obliczu wyzwań, jakie 
stają przed Polską w związku z kryzysem procesu integracji europejskiej.
Słowa kluczowe: Unia Europejska, Polska
